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The First Amendment on the Battlefield:
A Constitutional Analysis of Press
Access to Military Operations in
Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf
David A. Frenznick"
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather
news, write it, publish it, and circulate it. When any
one of these integral operations is interdicted,
freedom of the press becomes a river without
water. 1
This Article addresses the rights of the press and the public
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to
demand access to American military operations. Part I of this
Article examines the history of the war correspondent beginning
with the American Revolution, with primary emphasis on the
Vietnam War, the invasion of Grenada, the invasion of Panama,
and the Persian Gulf War.' Part I[ discusses several First
Amendment issues arising in the context of the battlefield, with
primary focus on the doctrine of prior restraint, the right of the
public to receive information, and the developing right of media
* Member, Law Firm of Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Bimey, Sacramento, California.
J.D., University of California, Davis, 1986; BA., Journalism, B.A., German, California State
University, Northridge, 1983. I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Matthew J. Smith (J.D.
candidate, University of California, Davis, 1992), the patience and understanding of my wife, Susan,
and the support of my law firm. I wish to dedicate this Article to my father, Bernhard Frenznick, a
great lawyer who taught me by example that one can achieve anything with dedication, determination,
and a lot of hard work.
1. In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 272, 126 A.2d 679, 687, (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
2. See infra notes 110-247.
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access.3 Finally, Part III concludes that the press may claim a First
Amendment right of access to the battlefield and that the military
must affirmatively facilitate the exercise of this right
I. THE TRADmONAL ROLE OF THE PRESS IN WARTIME:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A tradition of cooperation between the military and the press
can be documented as far back as the Civil War.' While some
commentators dispute this claim of traditional cooperation and
openness,6 it is undisputed that journalists have always played a
pivotal role in providing the public with combat-related
information. If such press involvement has rendered the battlefield
"traditionally open," the press may have a First Amendment right
of access to American military operations.7
A. From The American Revolution To The Vietnam War
During the American Revolution, newspapers were largely
unorganized and were unable to cover the war in a systematic
fashion.' As a result, newspapers derived their information from
3. See infra notes 5-109.
4. See infra pages 358-59.
5. 200-Year Tradition Broken, NEws MEDIA & THE LAW at 4 (Jan. 1984) [hereinafter
Tradition]. See Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1984, at A10, col. 1
(arguing that American journalists have accompanied troops on military operations since the
Revolutionary War). But see F. Mon, AMRIUCAN JOURNALISM 99 (1962) (no organized press corp
existed to cover the war).
6. Cassel, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access,
Grenada and Off-The Record Wars, 73 GEo. 14. 931 (1985).
7. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In Globe Newspaper, the
United States Supreme Court found a First Amendment right of access to the criminal trial based
upon the historical openness of that judicial process. IL If the press' traditional involvement in
reporting military operations has rendered the battlefield "'open," the press may be able to
constitutionally demand that the military grant it access to the battlefield. See infra notes 169-175 and
accompanying text (discussing Globe Newspaper and the right of access to judicial proceedings).
8. Moan, supra note 5, at 99. Media organization is vital to any coverage effort because
eyewitness accounts must be transmitted quickly from the fighting to the newspaper. Id. No such
organization existed during the Revolutionary War. let Generally, newspapers filled their news
columns with stories clipped from other newspapers, both foreign and domestic. Id. Each newspaper
printed local news, which contributed to the total fund of stories, but reports sometimes took weeks,
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letters and messages from soldiers stationed at the front.9 This lack
of organization continued through the War of 1812.10 It was not
until 1846, during the Mexican-American War, that newspapers
became technologically capable of providing wide coverage of the
battlefield."1 Thus, the modem war correspondent was born.
The reporters and artists who covered the Civil War enjoyed
extraordinary journalistic freedom.12  Although these journalists
incurred the wrath of military commanders and even President
Lincoln, 3 the government generally afforded them liberal
privileges.14 Despite several instances of military suppression of
or even months, to reach the other newspapers. I& For example, the battles of Lexington and
Concord occurred on April 19, 1775, but were not reported in the Baltimore Gazette until April 27
and not until May 31 in the Savannah Gazette. Id. at 99-101.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 196. News reports generally came from Washington, but were slow in getting to the
newspapers. Id One young editor often met the night stage as it passed through and questioned the
passengers while the driver changed horses. Id.
11. IdL During the Mexican-American War, the nine New Orleans papers, which were
geographically closest to the fighting, had correspondents at the front. d All other American
newspapers relied on their reports. Id at 248-49. By 1846, newspapers had a large enough readership
to permit expenditure of funds to collect and quickly transmit stories from the battlefield to the
printer. Id The Charleston Courier and the New York Sun, for example, set up horse expresses over
the gap in the railroad system through Mississippi and Alabama, which greatly improved transmission
speed. Id. Once the reports reached Richmond, Virginia, operators put the stories on the telegraph
and transmitted them to newspapers in Northern States. Id.
12. J. RANDAL., CONSlTUtIrONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LiNcoLN 484 (1958). "'Newspaper
correspondents were everywhere. Many had official positions as government clerks, army nurses, or
signal officers, and were thus advantageously placed for obtaining news." Id.
13. Randall, The Newspaper Problem in its Bearing upon Militry Secrecy During the Civil
War, 23 AM. HIST. Rsv. 303, 477-510 (1987). The press continually published military information,
such as plans for campaigns, movement of troops, and locations of military units, which was used
by the South to plan their strategy. Id Some northern newspapers were openly hostile toward the
Lincoln administration and the President himself. Id The Baltimore Exchange, for example, publicly
supported the Confederate cause:
The war of the South is the war of the people, supported by the people. The war of the
North is a war of the party, attempted to be carried on by political schemes, independently
of the people, on the credit of a divided country, and on the ... faith of an old union -
which has in reality, ceased to exist.
Id. at 488 (quoting from Baltimore Exchange, July 10, 1861).
14. RANDAI.L, supra note 12, at 303.
Usually the correspondents were accorded the most liberal privileges. Government passes
were put into their hands; they had the use of government horses and wagons; they were
given transportation with baggage privileges on government steamers and military trains.
They enjoyed the confidence of admirals and army commanders, and were seldom at a
loss to obtain the information they desired. Staying behind the lines as they usually did,
they heard an immense deal of officers' talk and could pick up not only the camp gossip
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newspapers 15 and some attempts at censorship,16 the press was
generally able to publish everything it learned about the war.
During the Spanish-American War in 1898, the press used the
telegraph to transmit stories quickly to stateside editors. 7
Journalists became proficient at gathering news, and the military
cooperated by placing few restrictions on the press. 8
During World War I, military officials assigned reporters to
individual commanders, and these reporters were afforded limited
freedom of movement 9 Prepublication censorship prevailed.2"
but also many telling snatches of military information.
Id. at 307.
15. RANDALL, supra note 12, at 492-93. Among those newspapers suppressed were the
Chicago Times, New York World, New York Journal of Commerce, Dayton Empire, Louisville
Courier, New Orleans Crescent, South of Baltimore, Maryland New Sheet of Baltimore, Baltimore
Gazette, Daily Baltimore Bulletin, Philadelphia Evening Journal, and the New Orleans Advocate. Id.
16. Id. at 481-84. The government made feeble attempts to censor press dispatches sent over
the national wire, but journalists simply used the mail instead. Id President Lincoln exercised a great
restraint when dealing with the press. Id He expressed his concern in a letter to General Schofield
in which he wrote:
You will only arrest individuals and suppress assemblers or newspapers when they may
be working palpable injury to the military in your charge, and in no other case will you
interfere with the expression of opinion in any form or allow it to be interfered with
violently by others. In this you have discretion to exercise with great caution, calmness
and forbearance.
Id. at 508.
17. MonT, supra note 5, at 537. Cable tolls were high. it is estimated that New York
newspapers filed up to 5,000 words per day over the wire from the Key West cable office. At the
current rate of five cents per word, these newspapers spent up to $250 per day in cable fees alone.
Id/
18. Id. at 533. See J. MATiWs, REPoNr THE WARS 141 (1957) (discussing military-press
relations during the Spanish-American War). Historians estimate that as many as 500 writers,
photographers, and artists covered the fighting for scores of newspapers and magazines. MoTr, supra
note 5, at 534. President McKinley issued permits to the Associated Press that allowed its reporters
to accompany each flagship. Id. at 536. When Dewey's fleet sailed into Manila Bay, for instance,
three correspondents were on board and observed the fighting. Id.
19. Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, § 6, at 37.
With the size of World War , it soon became apparent that the front-line trenches were not the best
places to gather news about larger movements of troops. Accordingly, military headquarters became
the press centers. MoT, supra note 5, at 619.
20. Middleton, supra note 9, at 37. "The American Army entering World War I found itself
wrapped in the censorship already established by Britain and France, the senior allies, who instituted
it for the purpose of security." Id. Military officials screened all cables and mail bound for the
United States, excising offensive material or returning the dispatch to the correspondent for a rewrite.
MoTr, supra note 5, at 621-22. At one point, French and British authorities considered excluding all
reporters from their armies. MATEws, supra note 18, at 161. The British and French were
determined to exclude all reporters in 1914 when fighting on the Western front became trench
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In addition, military officials had the authority to revoke any
journalist's accreditation if he or she released stories without prior
military clearance.2 Although during the early part of World War
I reporters were not permitted to cover the front, by 1918 American
journalists enjoyed unrestricted access to these areas.'
World War II was the golden age for war correspondents.23
Reporters such as Ernie Pyle reached millions of American readers
with stories from all over Europe and the Pacific.24 Prepublication
censorship was the rule, 2 yet it applied only to military matters
and did not preclude military commanders from talking freely with
reporters.26 Military officers were readily accessible on the various
fronts, and reporters had complete freedom of movement.27
Correspondents even accompanied the troops on many dangerous
missions, all with the approval and support of the government.28
warfare. Id That type of warfare is virtually impossible to report without direct access to the fighting.
Id.
21. M. SriaN, Ulmm FIm TI-m STORY Op A~mmcAN WAR CORREsPONDEM, at 72 (1968).
22. Id. at 73. Reporters with foreign armies were afforded such freedom: "Once accredited,
correspondents might go and come as they pleased; writers with other armies were commonly
compelled to go about with military escorts, but American correspondents could visit front-line
trenches alone if they pleased, or even 'go over the top." MolT, supra note 5, at 621. It is
interesting to note that during World War I women made their first appearance as war correspondents.
Id. at 622.
23. During the entire war, the U.S. War Department accredited 1,186 American correspondents
and other news personnel. Mor", supra note 5, at 742. The Navy Department accredited an additional
60 reporters. l Thirty newspapers, the two wire services, and twelve magazines maintained
correspondents at the war fronts. Id
24. In 1944, Pyle won the Pulitzer Prize for reporting. l at 754. He was killed on April 18,
1945, the victim of a Japanese machine gun sniper. Id.
25. See Middleton, supra note 19, at 61 (stating that every written story, photograph, or
broadcast was scrutinized by U.S. military censors).
26. Id. Middleton recalled that "World War I correspondents were permitted, if not
encouraged, to interview officers dealing with operations, intelligence or military government" Id.
27. Id.
28. MoTr, supra note 5, at 759. A total of 37 writers, photographers, and radio men were
killed during the war, and 112 were wounded. l Journalists had a casualty rate four times higher
than the fighting forces. Id But see Middleton, supra note 19, at 61 (estimating that 140
correspondents died during World War H). Middleton's calculation may include combat
correspondents; soldiers assigned to write for various military newspapers.
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The harmonious relationship between the military and the
press29 deteriorated diring the Korean and Vietnam wars.3" In
the early years of the Korean War, military authorities simply
expelled reporters if they were displeased with their stories.3' This
led to the imposition of full military censorship by General
Douglas MacArthur in 1951.32 All editorial copy had to be
approved by military censors prior to transmission to the
correspondent's newspaper or magazine.33 This broad military
control nevertheless permitted reporters liberal access to the
battlefronts.
During the Vietnam War reporters were permitted to observe
military activity throughout the combat theater.35 This freedom
was coupled with a form of censorship imposed at the source:
military authorities simply refused to give any information to
distrusted journalists.36 Military officers were convinced that
biased reporting caused the American public's opposition to the
war, and this belief fostered the military's hostility toward the
29. Tradition, supra note 5, at 5. Six correspondents accompanied the plane when U.S. forces
bombed Rome and a reporter was present in the air when the second atomic bomb exploded over
Japan. Id. See generally J. MAc VANE, ON THE Ant IN WORLD WAR II (1979) (accounting of war
correspondent's adventures reporting battlefield news).
30. Middleton, supra note 19, at 61.
31. P. KNIGHTLY, THE FIRST CASUALTY - FROM CRIMEA To VI1NAM: THE WAR
CoRREsoNDENr As HERO, PROPAOANDIST AND MYTH MAKER 337 (1975).
32. Id. at 245-46. Correspondents were under the complete jurisdiction of the army. l Any
infraction of the imposed rules could be punished by suspension of privileges, deportation, or even
court martial. Id. MacArthur made it clear that criticism of military policy or commanders would not
be tolerated. Id.
33. Id.
34. STEIN, supra note 21, at 149; KNIoHNY, supra note 31, at 340. Journalists even
accompanied the troops on the Inchon landing.
35. In contrast to the total military censorship during World War II, during the Vietnam War
overt censorship (i.e., actual inspection of correspondents' cables and mail) did not exist, yet the
military still allowed reporters almost complete freedom of movement.
36. Middleton, supra note 19, at 61. See Administration Limits News of Grenada, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 1983, at A23, col. 4 (stating that no censorship occurred during the Vietnam War).
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press.37 Thus, it is not surprising that by the end of the Vietnam
War, deterioration of military-press relations reached its apogee. 8
B. The Invasion Of Grenada
The hostility between the military and the press resurfaced in
1983 when American troops spearheaded an invasion of the small
Caribbean island of Grenada on October 25." Over 700 Army
Rangers, 1,200 Marines, and various contingents from seven
Caribbean nations participated in the invasion.' It was the first
major American military action since the Vietnam War.41
The American public learned of the invasion of Grenada on the
day it occurred when President Ronald Reagan declared in a
televised news conference that the United States had "no choice
but to act strongly and decisively" to oppose "a brutal gang of
leftist thugs" who had violently taken over the island on March 12,
1983, killing Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.42 Shortly
after President Reagan's announcement, nearly 400 reporters
converged upon Barbados.43 Faced with the refusal of the military
to assist them in reaching the island, several reporters chartered
37. Middleton, supra note 19, at 61, 69; Military v. Press: A Troubled History, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, coL 1; Marines Give Media Low Marks, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1983, § 11, at
1, col 5. But see Mueller, A Summary Of Public Opinion And The Vietnam War in VIETNM As
HISTORY: TEN YEARS AFTER THE PARS PEACE ACCORDS (P. Braestrup ed. 1984) (discussing the
causes of American hostility to the War).
38. The Vietnam War was the first U.S. military engagement in which television played a
significant role in reporting the events. For an interesting discussion of television and its influence
on public opinion during the Vietnam War, see generally Lichty, Comments On The Influence Of
Television On Public Opinion, in VMTNAM As HISTORY: TEN YEARS AFrER TiHE PAWtS PEACE
ACCORDS 158 (P. Braestrup ed. 1984).
39. N.Y. Times, Oct 26, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
40. Invasion Troops Trained to Make Surprise Raids, N.Y. Times, Ocr. 26,1983, at A16, col.
5.
41. Id.
42. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,1983, at Al, col. 1. See Text ofReagan'sAnnouncement ofInvasion,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A16, col. 5 (setting forth contents of President Reagan's announcement
of invasion).
43. See U.S. Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at
A13, col. 6 (stating that there were at least 300 reporters in Barbados). But see Coverage Efforts
Thwarted, NEws MEDIA & TE LAW, at 6 (Jan. 1984) (stating that within hours after Reagan
announced the invasion, more than 400 journalists converged on Barbados).
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their own boats in an effort to reach the fighting." It is reported
that military ships and aircraft forcibly turned back at least two
press boats and a plane carrying reporters en route to Grenada.
45
Military commanders warned other journalists that military
personnel had been directed to fire upon anyone attempting to
obtain access to Grenada.46
With coverage efforts stymied, reporters relied upon reports
from ham radio operators in Grenada, reports broadcast by Radio
Havana, and Department of Defense press releases. 7 Four of the
seven reporters who were already on the island accepted an offer
from the military to go aboard the U.S.S. Guam, which was
anchored just off the Grenadian coast, to file their reports from the
ship.48 When the reporters arrived on board, the ship's commander
refused to allow' them use of the communications equipment, and
would not let them leave the ship for two days.49
On October 27, 1983, two days after the invasion, the U.S.
military finally allowed a group of fifteen reporters to visit the
island."0 However, these reporters were unable to file their reports
that day because their return flight was delayed, ostensibly due to
excess air traffic."1  Consequently, when President Reagan
appeared on national television that evening to explain the invasion,
the American public had seen only brief film clips produced and
44. Coverage Efforts Thwarted, supra note 43, at 6.
45. Id. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, Grenada task force commander, was quoted as saying,
"Well, I know how to stop those press boats. We've been shooting at them. We haven't sunk any
yet, but how are we to know who's on them." Admiral Says It Was His Decision to Tether the Press,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A12, col. 3.
46. Coverage Efforts Thwarted, supra note 43, at 6; Admiral Says It Was His Decision to
Tether the Press, supra note 45, at A12, col. 3.
47. U.S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action: News Groups Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983,
at Al, col. 6. The flow of information from the Pentagon was slow. Fred Hoffman, an AP
correspondent, reported that the Pentagon received information early in the morning of October 26
that six U.S. soldiers had been killed in Grenada, yet the Pentagon refused to confirm those reports
until late that afternoon. Journalists BarredFrom Grenada CombatArea, L.A. Times, Oct. 27, 1983,
§1, at 16, col. 1.
48. U.S. Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A13,
col. 5; Coverage Efforts Thwarted, supra note 43, at 6.
49. Id.
50. Id. The fifteen reporters were part of a news pool. Id. They gathered information on the
island and then shared it with all other reporters. Id.
51. Id.
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edited by the military.52 The public had not heard any reports
from independent eye witnesses. 5
3
On October 28, 1983, the United States military allowed
another small contingent of reporters to visit Grenada.54 The very
next day, the Senate voted to end the press restrictions.55 Finally,
on October 30, 1983, five full days after the landing of U.S. troops
on Grenada, military authorities granted almost unlimited media
access to the island.56
Shortly after the Grenada operation and the resulting criticisms
by the media,57  press representatives requested a formal
52. Coverage Efforts Thwarted, supra note 43, at 6.
53. Id.
54. U.S. Press Curbs; The Unanswered Questions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
During the military tour of the island, one Newsweek reporter broke from the group and failed to
return. The military promptly dropped that magazine from the press pool. Newsweek Is Droppedfrom
Grenada Visits, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A22, col. 6.
55. Res. 208, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 129 Cong. Rec. S14957 (daily ed. Oct. 29,
1983). The resolution provided in pertinent part: "Since a free press is an essential feature of our
democratic system of government and since currently in Lebanon and traditionally in the past, the
United States has allowed the press to cover conflicts involving United States armed forces,
restrictions imposed upon the press in Grenada shall cease." Id.
56. U.S. Eases Restrictions on Coverage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A18, col. 2. The
Reagan administration attempted to justify the exclusion of the press from Grenada by citing the need
for surprise and the inability to guarantee the safety of reporters. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at AIS,
col. 2. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that he had left access decisions up to the
military and that he "wouldn't ever dream of overriding a commander's decision." Id. White House
Press Secretary Larry Speakes probably more accurately described the reason for the press exclusion
when, in answering a reporter's question about the administration's reason for the denial, he stated,
"You're carrying your management's water on this thing." Administration Limits News of Grenada,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A23, col. 6. For an excellent panel discussion of the reasons postulated
by the Reagan administration for the denial of press access, see generally The Grenada Experience,
CENTER MAO., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 53.
57. The media reacted to the Reagan administration's denial of press access to Grenada with
controlled fury. Several telegrams denouncing the restraint were sent to the Pentagon and the White
House. Coverage Efforts Thwarted, supra note 43, at 6. National columnists protested immediately.
Anthony Lewis of the New York Tunes asked: "What feared knowledge was President Reagan trying
to keep from the American public on Grenada? Why did he bar the press from the invasion of that
small island as General Eisenhower did not feel it necessary to do when his forces challenged the
might of the Nazis?" Lewis, What Was He Hiding, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A19, col. 6. A New
York Times editorial criticized the administration explanation: "Safety? Let Mr. Weinberger consider
the Iwo Jima memorial, not a mile from his office - the Marines raising the flag on Mount Suribachi.
How much safety does he think was guaranteed Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press, who took the
famous picture." Grenada -- and Mount Suribachi, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A26, col. 1.
Other voices of dissent included Deputy Press Secretary Les Jenka, who resigned, saying the
events in the Caribbean had damaged his credibility. LA. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, § 1, at 14, col. 3.
CBS News President Edward Joyce and newsmen David Brinkley and John Chancellor appeared
323
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Department of Defense review of military press access policies. 58
The Department formed a panel to study media complaints and
make necessary recommendations to the government. 59 The panel
was headed by a retired major general and was comprised of both
military and press representatives.' Based upon the panel's
recommendations, the Pentagon created a press pool designed to
accompany the troops on any surprise operation.6
C. The Invasion Of Panama
The press pool system underwent its first test in a combat
situation in December 1989, when American troops invaded
before Congress. They assailed the ban on firsthand news gathering in Grenada, calling the policy
"[t]he dawn of a new era of censorship." L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, § 1, at 9, col. 1. Much of the
controversy centered around charges that the Reagan administration and military officials had
disseminated inaccurate information and unproven assertions. Taylor, In Wake of Invasion, Much
Official Misinformation by U.S. Comes to Light, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 1. Further,
the administration failed to disclose a U.S. Navy air attack on an unmarked Grenadian hospital in
which at least twelve civilians were killed. U.S. Admits Air Attack on Hospital in Grenada, L.A.
Times, Nov. 1, 1983, § I, at 1, col. 2. Official confirmation came six days after the attack and only
after press accounts began to surface. Id.
58. A Second Look at the Off-the-Record War, TIE, Nov. 21, 1984, at 77.
59. The panel was composed ofjournalists, journalism professors, public information officers,
and military representatives. Panel Supports Press Access to Combat, LA. Times, Feb. 7, 1984, §1,
at 7, col. 4. In August 1984, the Pentagon made public the panel's recommendations, announcing the
general principle that news media coverage of U.S. military operations was essential and access
should be allowed to the maximum degree possible. Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Media -
Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel), Report 3 (1984) [hereinafter Sidle Panel Report].
60. Sidle Panel Report, supra note 59, at 3. The panel was headed by Major General (retired)
Winant Sidle, a former military press officer in Vietnam. Id.
61. Pentagon Forms War Press Pool; Newspaper Reporters Excluded, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1984, at Al, col. 2. The pool included eleven press representatives including one correspondent each
from the Associated Press and United Press International; one from a news magazine; one each from
CBS, NBC, ABC and Cable News Service; a radio news broadcaster, a cameraman, a sound
technician, and a still photographer. Id. See Pact Reached on Media Pool to Cover Military
Operations, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1984, at Al, col. 4 (discussing the creation of the press pool).
Following protest from newspapers, the Pentagon quickly agreed to include a newspaper reporter in
the pool. Pentagon Plans to Add Newspaper Reporter as Member of its Press Pool, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
Initial media reaction to the Sidle Report and the formation of the press pool was generally
favorable, however, some press representatives criticized the vagueness of the report and the
nonbinding nature of the guidelines. Compare Commander, or Censor, in Chief?, N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1984, at A18, col. 1 (the Sidle Report provides reasonable guidelines) with Zuckerman, Outlook:
Don't be Co-opted by the Folks Who Brought Us Vietnam, Grenada, and the Iranian Rescue Fiasco,
3 Comd. LAW. 15 (1985) (Pentagon's rules represent licensing and censorship).
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Panama to oust dictator Manuel Noriega 2 The pool, consisting
of newspaper, television, radio, wire service, and magazine
representatives,63 departed for Panama aboard a military aircraft
at approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 19, 1989.64 By the time
the pool arrived in Panama, around 5:30 a.m. on December 20, the
invasion had been under way for about four hours.
65
Upon arrival, the pool was stranded at the airport for three
hours because the military did not have any available
transportation." Meanwhile, military authorities prevented
nonpool reporters from arriving in chartered aircraft because the
airports were declared unsafe.67 As a result of these delays, the
press was unable to cover the crucial initial hours of the
invasion.6
Early television coverage of the invasion was limited to
photographs provided by the Pentagon.69 Pool television materials
did not begin arriving until 5:40 p.m. on December 20, about five
hours later than anticipated by media executives °.7  By the time the
military allowed nonpool reporters to land their aircraft late in the
evening on December 21,71 President Bush had already declared
the operation "pretty well wrapped-up." 72
62. Jones, Editors Say Journalist Were Kept From Action, N.Y. Times,- Dec. 22, 1989, at
A19, col. 3. The press pool had been deployed previously in a noncombat situation in the Persian
Gulf, when United States warships began escorting tankers there. Id.
63. Id At the time of the Panama invasion, the pool consisted of 16 members: one reporter
and one photographer each from the Associated Press, Reuters, and Time Magazine; a reporter from
United Press International; a radio reporter from ABC News; a five-person television crew from NBC
News; and three newspaper reporters. Id.
64. Id
65. Gordon, Cheney Blamed for Press Problems in Panama, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1990, at
A8, col. 4.
66. Jones, supra note 62, at A19, col. 3.
67. Id.
68. Gordon, supra note 65, at A8, col. 4. News executives complained that by the time the
pool arrived in Panama, most of the fighting had ended. Jones, supra note 62, at A19, col. 3.
69. Goodman, The Television Has Become a Weapon in Panama and Rumania, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 26, 1989, at AI8, col. 1.
70. Jones, supra note 62, at A19, col. 3.
71. Id.
72. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
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News organizations were highly critical of the military's
handling of the pool system in Panama.73 Pete Williams, the chief
Pentagon spokesperson, citing "incompetence" as the reason for
the limited access afforded to the press in the initial hours of the
invasion, 74 commissioned a study of the events.75 The resulting
report blamed Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney for activating the
pool too late and for rejecting a plan proposed by public affairs
officials at the United States Southern Command in Panama to
organize a pool from reporters already in Panama to cover the
beginning of the invasion.
D. The Persian Gulf War
Strained by the failure of the pool system in Panama, relations
between the press and the military degenerated further with the
advent of the Persian Gulf War. On January 3, 1991, with the
United Nations deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
approaching on January 15, the Pentagon distributed proposed
regulations for press coverage in the event of war.77 Under the
proposed regulations, reporters would be restricted to travelling in
a limited number of pools accompanied by military escorts at all
times.78 Moreover, under the proposed regulations all reports
would be subject to military censorship in the form of a "security
review" by information officers in the field.79 The proposed
regulations imposed several additional limitations.8"
73. Gordon, supra note 65, at AS, col. 4. See The Pentagon Pool, Bottled Up, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1990, at A16, col. I (editorial criticizing pool system).
74. Jones, supra note 62, at A19, col. 3.
75. Gordon, supra note 65, at AS, col. 4.
76. Id
77. Gordon, Pentagon Seeks Tight Limits On Reporters in a Gulf War, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,
1991, at A10, col. 1.
78. Id
79. Id
80. The proposed regulations included a ban on impromptu interviews with soldiers,
prohibitions on reporting religious observations, and a ban on photographing soldiers wounded or in
shock Id. See Rosenstiel, Pentagon Softens Its Guidelines on News Coverage of Gulf War, L.A.
Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at A10, col. 1 (discussing proposed regulations for press coverage).
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In response to complaints from the press, the Pentagon
eliminated some of the restrictions before officially adopting the
regulations on January 9, 1991.1 Nevertheless, the two most
criticized restrictions--the pool system and the security review--
remained,12 making the Persian Gulf press restrictions the most
strict in American journalistic history.83
The official press regulations went into effect on January 17,
1991, when the American bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait began.
Pools were deployed to watch aircraft take off and return, and
some reporters were allowed to speak with returning pilots.84
However, military officials released very few details about the
progress of the air war, 5 and some censorship occurred. 6
Members of the press articulated complaints regarding the lack of
information made available to reporters and the delays in reporting
caused by the security review system. 7 By the end of the first
week of the war, the press was demanding an end to the
regulations.
88
81. Rosenstiel, supra note 80, at A10, col 1; Lewis, Pentagon Issues Press Rules Authorizing
Military Censors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,1991, at A10, col. 5; Lewis, Pentagon Adopts GulfNews Rules,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at A16, col. 6. Revised versions of the regulations were issued on January
14 and January 30, 1991. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1564 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
82. Lewis, Pentagon Adopts News Rules, supra note 81, at A16, col. 5.
83. Rosenstiel & Lamb, Military, Media Face Off in Gulf, L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al,
col. 1. Prior to the Persian Gulf war, corespondents had never been subject to both escorted
movement and censorship.
84. Lewis, Government's Strict Orders Limit Reports, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,1991, at All, col.
1.
85. Id Most significantly, the lack of information prevented the press from reporting on the
magnitude of the air war. Rosenbaum, Press and U.S. Officials at Odds on News Curbs, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 20, 1991, § I, at 16, col. 3.
86. Lewis, Pentagon Adopts News Rules, supra note 81, at A16, col. 5. In some instances,
journalists later learned that information withheld in the field was released by the Pentagon soon
after. Browne, Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalists, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1991, at A10,
col. 5.
87. Rosenbaum, supra note 85, at A16, col 3; Browne, supra note 86, at AI0, col. 5; Balzar,
Pool Reporting: There's Good News and Bad News, LA. Times, Jan. 21, 1991, at Al, col. 5;
Rosenthal, Bush's Tight Control N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A8, col. 1.
88. Back Up the Bombing Boasts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A18, col. 1; Schiffer &
Rinzler, No News Is No News, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A19, col. 2; Rosenthal, War: The One-
Week Jitters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1991, at A29, col. 1; Gergen, Military vs. Media: Both Can Win,
LA. Times, Jan. 28, 1991, at B5, col. 3.
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With the advent of ground fighting in late January 1991, the
pool system began to collapse. 9 No pool reporter witnessed the
fighting in Khafji, but correspondents who skirted the pools
provided several accounts of the battle." As ground fighting
continued, more reporters and photographers circumvented the
organized pools.91 By February 12, 1991, more than two dozen
journalists had been detained by the military for violating the pool
restrictions.'
On February 23, 1991, two hours after the U.S. ground
offensive began, the Pentagon imposed a complete news
blackout.93 Regular briefings in Washington and Riyadh were
suspended and dispatches from the pools were delayed, ostensibly
for security reasons.94 In response to the blackout, hundreds of
reporters travelled into the desert on their own, in violation of the
89. See Apple, Press and the Military: Old Suspicions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at A9, col.
4 [hereinafter Old Suspicions] (noting that the "'pool system may be on the verge of collapse"). One
of the greatest drawbacks of the pool system was the limited number of positions available. Early
estimates placed the number of pool reporters between 60 and 99, out of the more than 700
journalists with credentials in the Persian Gulf. Browne, supra note 86, at A10, col. 5 (speculating
that there were "about 60 pool reporters"); Balzar, supra note 87, at Al, col. 5 (estimating 99
combat pool reporters). As the conflict continued, the number of pool spots increased. See Apple,
Correspondents Protest Pool System, N.Y. Tnes, Feb. 12, 1991, at A14, col. I [hereinafter Protest]
(specifying that there were 126 in Pentagon pools); Berke, Pentagon Defends Coverage Rules, While
Admitting to Some Delays, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1991, at A14, col. I (estimating 192 pool members
by end of week). However, the number of journalists in the Gulf also increased. See Protest, supra,
at A14, col. 1 (reporting that there were more than 1000 accredited journalists); Berke, supra, at A14,
col I (stating there were more than 1400 journalists in Gulf region).
90. Old Suspicions, supra note 89, at A9, col. 4. But see Kifner, Reporters Get Out of the
Pool to Get Their Feet Wet, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1991, § 1, at 7, col. 2 (indicating that pool member
Brad Willis, NBC television correspondent, was present at Khafji).
91. See Restrictions on War Photos, N.Y. Times, Feb. I, 1991, at A9, col. 3 (stating that some
photographers skirting pool arrangement); Old Suspicions, supra note 89, at § 1, at 7, col. 2 (noting
that violation of Pentagon ground rules "commonplace"); Kifner, supra note 90, at § I, at 7. col. 2.
92. Protest, supra note 89, at A14, col. 1. Some journalists also had their credentials
confiscated by military officers. Reporter is Detained, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1991, at A13, col. 5.
93. Berke, News From Gulf is Good, and Cheney's Press Curbs Are Loosened, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 1991, at A17, col. 3.
94. Id According to various news executives, the blackout was motivated by the Pentagon's
desire to control the dissemination of any bad news, rather than by the need for security. Rosenstiel,
Battle Success Helps Soften News Blackout, LA. Times, Feb. 25, 1991, at A8, col. 3.
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pool restrictions.95 Some of these journalists provided the first
accounts of the ground war.96
The news blackout did not last long. On the morning of
February 24, 1991, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney gave
permission for General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to provide a
briefing to reporters in Riyadh regarding the early success of the
offensive.97 Soon thereafter, dispatches began to arrive from pool
reporters in the field. 93 One week later, with the informal
cessation of the war on March 4, 1991, the Pentagon lifted all press
restrictions in the Persian Gulf.99
E. Legal Challenges To Military Restrictions On Press Access
Members of the press have raised two significant legal
challenges to press restrictions employed by the government in
recent military conflicts. Shortly after the invasion of Grenada,
Hustler Magazine publisher Larry Flynt filed suit in federal district
court against Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.1°° Flynt
alleged that the exclusion of Hustler Magazine reporters from the
initial stages of the Grenada operation violated the First
Amendment."°1 The court dismissed the suit as moot, observing
that the invasion of Grenada was a unique event and therefore not
95. Rosenstiel, supra note 94, at A8, col 3.
96. Id
97. Berke, supra note 93, at A17, col. 3; Rosenstiel, supra note 94, at A8, col. 3.
98. Berke, supra note 93, at A8, col. 3.
99. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep'L of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
100. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F.Supp. 57, 58 (D.D.C. 1984).
101. Id
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capable of repetition.1°2 The court of appeals unanimously
affmned the dismissal. 3
The second challenge occurred recently when members of the
media challenged the press restrictions employed during the Persian
Gulf War. On January 10, 1991, a group of news organizations and
writers, led by The Nation Magazine, filed suit against the
Department of Defense (DOD) in federal district court. °4 The
plaintiffs claimed that the pooling regulations infringed upon news
gathering privileges protected by the First Amendment. 5 On a
motion to dismiss by DOD, the court determined that the plaintiffs
had surmounted the jurisdictional barriers of lack of standing,106
the political question doctrine,"° and mootness. °8 The court
102. Id. at 59. Flynt sought to avoid dismissal on mootness grounds by arguing that the case
fell within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. See Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (discussing the mootness exception for an action capable of
repetition, yet evading review). The doctrine has been used in other press exclusion cases to
overcome the mootness allegation. See, e.g., Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603
(1982) (case was not moot because it could reasonably be assumed that Globe will someday be
subjected to another trial close order); Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1979) (order
closing pretrial hearing is too short in its duration to allow for review and it was possible publisher
would again be subject to a similar closure order). See generally Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L RBv. 373 (1974) (discussing the mootness doctrine and the recognized
exceptions thereto).
103. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The case was remanded with
instructions to dismiss on mootness grounds, but without prejudice. Id. Judge Edwards concurred, but
wrote a separate opinion in which he stated that the court did not reach the mootness question with
regard to the issue of whether the government can constitutionally deny access on the basis of danger
to the press (where an allegation is made that the government's actual motivation is to prevent
unfavorable press coverage) because the issue was raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 136.
104. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1560 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). See Rosenstiel & Lamb, supra note 83, at A16, col. 1; Old Suspicions, supra note 89, at A9,
col. 4 (discussing the lawsuit filed against the Department of Defense).
105. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1560-61.
106. Id. at 1565-66. Prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the action by The Nation
was consolidated with a similar action by Agence France-Presse (AFP), a French wire service. Id.
Since AFP had undeniably been excluded from the pools, the court found that the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the pooling regulations. Id.
107. Id. at 1566-68. The court concluded that the question of restrictions on press access did
not implicate the President's Article H powers as Commander-In-Chief, as contended by DOD. Id.
108. Id. at 1568-75. The court found that the claims for injunctive relief were moot because
the regulations had been lifted on March 4, 1991, prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Id.
at 1562. With regard to the claims for declaratory relief, however, the court found that the action
satisfied the "'capable of repetition, but evading review" test because the claims had been broadly
framed and DOD had lifted but not abrogated the regulations. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs in this case were
able to surmount the barrier that precluded the plaintiff in Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134, 135
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held, however, that the right of access claims were not sufficiently
focused to permit the court to exercise its discretion in granting
declaratory relief.1"
By refusing to address the merits in both of these press
challenges, the courts left unanswered important constitutional
questions raised by military restrictions imposed on the press.
Specifically, the courts failed to determine precisely what rights the
First Amendment guarantees to the press in relation to American
military operations, and whether the press has a First Amendment
right of access to the battlefield. The remainder of this Article
examines these issues, with primary focus on the doctrine of prior
restraint, the public's right to receive information, and the
developing right of access.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS ACCESS To THE BATrLEFIELD:
A VIOLAnON OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Traditionally, the press has used the First Amendment as a
"shield" against government intrusion into the editorial or
publication process by arguing that the right to publish is protected
by the doctrine of prior restraint. Recently, however, the press has
begun to use the First Amendment as a "sword" to force access
to previously restricted areas by relying on the developing right of
access. In analyzing the constitutionality of the restrictions on press
access to the battlefield in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf,
both functions of the First Amendment are necessarily implicated.
A. Prior Restraint -- The Constitutional Shield
1. Historical Context
(D.C. Cir. 1985) from pursuing his case.
109. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575. The court treated this question as a second part
of the mootness inquiry. Id. at 1571-75. The court reasoned that because resolution of these claims
would require the court to "defie the outer constitutional boundaries of access," the court would
decline to exercise its power to grant declaratory relief. Id. at 1572.
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Under the constitutional doctrine of prior restraint, the
government may not restrain publishers and broadcasters from
disseminating information except under the most extraordinary
circumstances." 0 Since the landmark decision of Near v.
Minnesota... in 1931, courts have used the doctrine of prior
restraint to shield publishers from prepublication governmental
intrusion. Although some scholars contend that the doctrine of prior
restraint is outdated,"' recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States demonstrate that the doctrine is still viable.
n3
In Near, the Court struck down a statute authorizing the state
of Minnesota to stop publication of any newspaper judged
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory." '114 In upholding the
newspaper's right to publish, the Court noted that to grant the
government authority to prevent publication would create a serious
public evil. l5 The Court held that the government must defer any
110. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The only exceptions recognized by the Near
court, in dicta, were for matters of national security and obscenity. Id. at 716. See infra notes 117-129
and accompanying text (discussing the national security exception).
111. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The idea of an antagonistic and adversary press was a primary
consideration in the adoption of the First Amendment. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 717 (1971). However, it was not until Near that the Court affirmed that central meaning
of the amendment. See Near, 283 U.S. at 719-21; see also Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBs. 648 (1955) (discussing the doctrine of prior restraint).
112. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraints, 92 YAIE LJ. 409 (1983) (historic protection of
doctrine superseded by expanded coverage of First Amendment); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior
Restraints, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977) (doctrine diminishes protection of speech not labeled prior
restraint).
113. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (six concurring
justices reject application for restraining order barring publication of classified government
information using doctrine as basis of opinion); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539,570
(1976) (unanimous decision rejects gag order in pretrial context as unconstitutional prior restraint);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971) (injunction halting
distribution of pamphlets is prior restraint, notwithstanding alleged invasion of privacy); Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County, 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977) (per curium) (reversal of trial court
order restricting publication of name and photograph of juvenile charged with murder).
114. Near, 283 U.S. at 705.
115. Id. at 722. The court observed:
Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance, unquestionably
create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guarantee is that even a more
serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent publication.
Id.
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sanction for publication of libel until after the press has exercised
its First Amendment right to publish.1 6
The First Amendment right to publish, however, is not
unlimited. In dicta, the Near court indicated that the government
could enjoin publications that threatened national security or were
obscene." 7 However, subsequent cases indicate that the Court has
narrowly construed the national security exception." 8
In New York Times Co. v. United States"9, the so-called
"Pentagon Papers" decision, 2 ' the Court applied the doctrine of
prior restraint and refused to enjoin publication of illegally obtained
classified information."' Although every member of the Court
expressed his views separately, each of the six concurring justices
and three dissenting justices "tacitly or explicitly, accepted the
Near . . . condemnation of prior restraint as presumptively
unconstitutional."' 2 Additionally, the plurality rejected the
government's attempt to justify the restraint as a threat to national
116. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. See Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904,907 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a court order requiring production of film for viewing by court before public release is
unconstitutional). The court in Goldblum observed: -It is a fundamental principal of the First
Amendment that the press may not be required to justify or defend what it prints or says until after
the expression has taken place." Id. at 907.
117. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. Chief Justice Hughes stated that 'no one would question but that
a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of sailing
date of transports or the number and location of troops." Id. Prior to New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), discussed infra at notes 119-129 and accompanying text, the Hughes
dicta was the sole constitutional authority directly relating to the problem of exceptions to the
doctrine of prior restraint in cases involving conflict between the free press and national security. See
generally Note, The National Security Exception to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 13 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 214 (1971).
118. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (discussing the
national security exception to the doctrine of prior restraint).
119. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
120. Id. The New York Times and the Washington Post obtained copies of a classified study
entitled "History of United States Decision-Making Process of Vietnam Policy." United States v.
New YorkTimes Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd.,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971). These
materials become known as the "'Pentagon Papers." Id.
121. New York Tunes, 403 U.S. at 713. The government based its power to impose prior
restraints on the press upon the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign
affairs and on the Espionage Act of 1917. Id. at 733-34.
122. Id. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (quoting Pillsbury Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm., 413 U.S. 376, 396 (1973) (Bunger, C.J. dissenting)).
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security." To justify even the issuance of an interim restraining
order,'24 wrote Justice Brennan, the government must allege and
prove that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately
cause the occurrence of an event similar to imperilling the safety
of a transport already at sea.125
Five years after the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,'26
unanimously rejected a trial court order restricting publication or
broadcast of accounts of a criminal defendant's confessions or
admissions in a murder case. 27 In so holding, the Court balanced
the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the press'
First Amendment right to publish, reiterating the result reached in
New York Times Co. v. United States.12 The Chief Justice stated
that "[t]he thread running through all these cases is that prior
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement of First Amendment rights." 29 Thus,
the Supreme Court decisions in the Pentagon Papers and Nebraska
Press Association cases establish that the government must
surmount formidable obstacles before any prior restraint of
publication will be constitutionally justified.
123. Id. at 718-19.
124. The interim restraining order, if granted, would have temporarily halted publication.
125. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated
that he could not say "disclosure of any of [the documents] will surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our nation or its people." Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
126. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
127. Id. at 542-44. The case involved the murder of a Nebraska family. Id. The order
specifically prohibited the media from reporting on five subjects: (1) The existence or contents of a
confession the accused had given to police and which the prosecution introduced at the arraignments;
(2) any statements made by the accused to other persons; (3) contents of a note written by the
accused; (4) aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; and (5) the identity of the
victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault. Id at 543-44. See W. FRANCOIS,
MASs MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 366 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing the Nebraska Press case).
128. Nebraska Press Ass'n., 427 U.S. at 542-44.
129. Id. at 559. The majority, however, did not rule out the possibility that the composition of
the gag order might pass constitutional muster where the trial court has exhausted all other measures
aimed at ensuring a fair trial. Id. at 563. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)
(murder conviction overturned based on adverse pretrial publicity; court suggested options for trial
judge to prevent impairment of sixth amendment right to fair trial).
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2. Prior Restraint Applied to Prevention of Reports from the
Battlefield
On the battlefield, a prior restraint would occur if the military
prevents journalists, who are legitimately in the area prior to the
outbreak of hostilities, from reporting news from the battlefield.
While it appears that this did not occur during the invasion of
Panama 3 ' or the Persian Gulf War,'31 it did occur during the
invasion of Grenada. There, the military removed four of seven
journalists who had reached the island before the invasion and held
them incommunicado." Perhaps the initial removal was the
result of a misunderstanding,'33 yet the journalists were detained
for more than 48 hours.'3 The length of detention indicates that
the military desired to, and indeed succeeded in preventing
immediate publication of legally gathered information. 13  This
detention was a prior restraint under Near and its progeny.Y
31
It is unlikely that the government can justify its detention of the
journalists in Grenada under the national security exception
130. In Panama, three reporters were detained briefly by American troops the day before the
invasion, but apparently they were not prevented from reporting. See News Personnel Detained, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at A8, col. 6.
131. In the Persian Gulf, numerous reporters were detained for violating the pool restrictions
once the war had begun. See supra notes 61-98 and accompanying text (discussing the press pool).
Because of the long prelude to hostilities, however, no prebattle detention occurred.
132. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text (discussing the invasion of Grenada).
133. The correspondents said they thought the military would allow them to use the ship's
communications equipment. U.S. Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1983, at A13, col. 5.
134. Id.
135. In the aftermath of the invasion, the military failed to offer any explanation for the
detention of the correspondents. Absent an explanation, one can reasonably conclude that the removal
and detention of the journalists was accomplished with the intent to prevent publication.
136. The Supreme Court has defined a "'prior restraint" as any governmental prepublication
interference with a person's right of expression. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971). Any prior restraint on
expression comes to the court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. Carrol v.
President & Comms. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). The government carries the burden of showing justification for the
imposition of a prior restraint. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 417.
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recognized in the Near and New York Times cases."' The
invasion had already been publicly announced by the President
when the military transported the four journalists to the ship.'
Therefore, the reporters' information could not have jeopardized the
secrecy of the invasion. Moreover, a less restrictive alternative to
detention was available.139 The military had ample opportunity to
censor the correspondents' copy before allowing them to use the
ship's communication equipment or transporting them to Barbados,
where they could have filed their stories on civilian equipment.
140
The failure of the military to exercise this less restrictive alternative
negates any argument supporting the national security exception.
Given the extreme judicial antipathy toward prior restraints,
even in the national security context, it is likely that the detention
of the four journalists during the early stages of the invasion of
Grenada would be held a violation of the First Amendment. A
more difficult issue arises, however, with regard to denial of press
access to the battlefield once hostilities have commenced.
Specifically, the issue is whether the press has a First Amendment
right of access to cover American military operations? To answer
this question, the relatively recent origins of the developing right
of access must be explored.
137. The New York Times Co. v. United States decision clearly implies that there is no change
in the presumption of unconstitutionality and the heavy burden to justify a prior restraint when the
government alleges national security. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 721
(1970). See generally Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND.
L.J. 209, 229 (1951).
138. Compare Text of Reagan's Announcement of Invasion, supra note 42, at A16, col. I
(dateline October 25, 1983) with U.S. Allows Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day, N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1983, at A13, col. 5 (dateline October 27, 1983) (journalists removed from island).
139. Although the Court has never had occasion to consider less restrictive alternatives in a
prior restraint case involving national security, the Court has indicated that it is part of the test. In
New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 713, the Court, in the per curiam section of the
opinion, cites Keefe for the proposition that any prior restraint carries a heavy burden of justification.
Id. Keefe cites Carro/, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), for the same proposition. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 416. The
Court in Carrol clearly used the less restricted alternative test to reach its decision. Carrol, 393 U.S.
at 181.
14-0. Few journalists would dispute the government's right in a military situation to review
correspondents' stories before transmission. See Editorial, News Media & The Law, Jan. 1984, at 3.
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B. The Public's Right To Receive Information and the Developing
Right Of Access
1. The Public's Right to Receive Information
Courts and commentators have referred to the public's right to
receive information as the core function of the First
Amendment.' Indeed, the authors of the First Amendment
considered the role of the press in the interchange of information
and ideas to be of pivotal importance. 142  However, an informed
public cannot exist without a free flow of information. 43  The
Court has consistently recognized this function of the press with
approval.' 44
Our society has become so complex that it is now impossible
for an individual acting alone to obtain information about
141. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-89 (2d ed. 1988). See also Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969). Justice White, speaking for a unanimous court
observed:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve the uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail.... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, ethnic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right
may not constitutionally be abridged by either Congress or the FCC.
Id. at 390.
142. For instance, Thomas Jefferson believed the press had the right to criticize the conduct
of public officials. L. LEvy, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER To JEFFERSON 355 (1966).
James Madison wrote that "[t]he right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of
free communication thereon, is the only effective guardian of every other right." 6 WRrrNos OF
JAMES MADISON 398 (1906). The Supreme Court found that the Continental Congress assented to
the proposition that a free, critical press would benefit the country. Thombill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 102 (1940).
143. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (discussion of
public issues vital to function of government); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (First
Amendment designed to encourage interchange of ideas); Ass6ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 20 (1945) (widest dissemination of information essential to public welfare).
144. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (the Court stated: "Suppression of the
right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents ... muzzles one of the very agencies the
framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep
it free"). The Court expressed a similar view in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) stating:
"The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs,
exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of
public events and occurrences .... " Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
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governmental affairs.1 45 Thus, it is reasonable for the public to
depend upon the press to gather information and to present that
information to the public in an understandable form. 146  These
considerations have led the Court to recognize that the press
functions as an agent of the public.147
Similar to the right of the press to publish information, the right
of the public to receive information is not unlimited. For example,
a United States citizen does not have an absolute right to travel to
Cuba to inform himself of conditions there.141 Nor do American
academics have an absolute First Amendment right to hear a
speech by a marxist professor who was denied a visa to enter the
United States. 149
The Supreme Court evaluates restrictions on the flow of
information by applying a balancing test. The public interest in
acquiring the information is weighed against the government's
145. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating:
'No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his
political responsibilities.").
146. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975). The Court observed:
[1In a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press
to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is
accordingly placed upon the news media... Without the information provided by the
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or
to register opinions on the administration of government generally.
Id.
147. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609. The majority observed:
Our decision in [Cox Broadcasting] merely affirmed the right of the press to publish
accurately information contained in court records open to the public. Since the press
serves as the information-gathering agent of the public, it could not be prevented from
reporting what it had learned and what the public was entitled to know.
Id. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating: "The institutional press is the likely, and fitting chief beneficiary of the right
of access because it serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens .. "); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 189 (1979) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (arguing for recognition of editorial privilege because it
would shield the press in its function as an agent of the public); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (stating that since it is unrealistic for most citizens to be personally familiar with all
newsworthy events, the press acts as an agent of the public when it gathers news).
148. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13 (1965) (right to speak and publish does not carry with it
an unrestrained right to gather information).
149. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,764-65 (1972) (recognized First Amendment rights
were implicated by denial of visa to marxist professor, who was to speak at American universities).
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interest in regulating the conduct.150  Courts have applied this
balancing test when the government has restricted the free flow of
information from grand jury proceedings,15' pretrial criminal
proceedings, 52  criminal trials, 53  judicial investigations,154
removal hearings, 155 and libel cases156 The recognition of a
public right to receive information has led the Supreme Court, by
use of the balancing test, to recognize a First Amendment right of
access in a few limited situations where the need for information
is great, such as in a judicial proceeding. This balancing test also
supports recognition of a First Amendment right of access to the
battlefield.
2. Access to Judicial Proceedings
In analyzing the right of media access to the battlefield, it is
necessary to consider other instances where the media has
successfully asserted a First Amendment right to gather
information. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court
150. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-88 (1972) (Court reached the decision
that journalist have no privilege not to answer grand jury subpoena by balancing competing societal
interests); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (government interest in regulating entry
of aliens outweighed citizens' right to hear marxist professor).
151. See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059,1089 (9th Cir. 1972) (reh'g denied, 466
F.2d 1090 (1972) (court compelled answers to some grand jury questions); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (D.C. Tex. 1979) (objection to production of unpublished
grand jury tapes sustained).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. D.C. 1976) (subpoena
quashed in suppression hearing); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229,235-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
aft'd, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (subpoena quashed in motion
to dismiss); State v. Saint Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (1974) (directions regarding
discovery issued to court below).
153. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); Zelenka v. State, 82 Wis.2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978)
(affirming the trial court's decision not to compel disclosure).
154. See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1975) (denial of petition for writ
of habeas corpus after incarceration for failure to disclose), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
155. See, e.g., Opinion of Justices, 117 NJ. 386,373 A.2d 644,646 (1977) (disclosure denied).
156. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 599 (1st Cir.
1980) (remand with directions); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631,639 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed,
417 U.S. 938 (1974) (disclosure ordered); Mize v. McGraw-Hill, 82 F.R.D. 475, 478 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (1979), aff'd. on reh'g, 86 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (disclosure denied); Senear v. Daily
Journal-American, 97 Wash.2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1982) (remand with directions).
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concerning access to judicial proceedings provide useful analogies
to the battlefield inquiry.
Commentators generally link the beginning of the modem push
toward recognition of a First Amendment right of media access to
the Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.'57 In
Branzburg, the Court considered whether newspersons have the
right to refuse to respond to a grand jury subpoena.'58 The
defendant newspaper claimed "that the burden on news gathering
resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential
information outweighs any public interest in obtaining
information."15 9 Although the Court ruled against the newspaper,
the majority opinion noted:
"We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."'
160
Although the Branzburg Court recognized the existence of at least
some First Amendment protection of news -gathering, the Court did
not define the constitutional limits of this protection.
In 1979, the Supreme Court considered the issue of public and
press access rights to pretrial proceedings in Gannett Co., Inc. v.
157. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In the earlier case of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) the court had
implied that news gathering merited some First Amendment protection. Zemel 381 U.S. at 16.
158. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. The case involved a Louisville-Courier reporter who had
written an article concerning the manufacture of hashish. Id. at 667. He promised anonymity to the
two persons he had interviewed and observed working with the substances. Id. at 667-68. After the
story appeared, a grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg to testify. Id. at 668. He appeared, but refused
to name his sources. Id. at 668, 670.
159. Id. at 681.
160. Id. Justice Stewart, although dissenting from the majority's conclusion that the press must
respond to a grand jury subpoena, agreed with the majority's statement regarding news gathering:
In keeping with this tradition [of press independence], we have held that the right to
publish is central to the First Amendment and basic to the existence of constitutional
democracy. A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full
flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be severely
curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by which news is
assembled and disseminated.
Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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DePasquale."' In Gannett, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee the media a right to attend such
proceedings when the trial judge, the prosecutor, and the criminal
defendant agree that closure is necessary to ensure a fair trial.' 62
The Court, however, did not consider access rights under the First
Amendment. 1
63
Largely as a result of misapplication of Gannett by the lower
courts,'" the Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari to decide
whether the public and press had a First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,165 seven of the nine justices agreed that the press and
public do have such a constitutional right.' 66 The Chief Justice,
writing for the plurality, placed special emphasis on the historical
openness of the courtroom.' 67 He concluded that a right of access
to places traditionally open to the public, such as criminal trials, is
guaranteed by the First Amendment.'
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court
solidified this First Amendment right of access in Globe
161. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
162. Id. at 379-84.
163. Id. at 392. The Court stated: "We need not decide in the abstract however, whether there
is any such constitutional right." Id.
164. Bolbach, Access to Information: Affirming the Press' Right, Christian Century, Sept. 24,
1980, Vol. 97, at 881 (stating that in response to the Gannett ruling, more than 260 attempted trial
closings were documented between July of 1979 and July of 1980).
165. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality decision).
166. Id at 558 (Burger, CJ., with White, J. and Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the
court). The court stated: "We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees
of the First Amendment." Id. "'Because I believe that the First Amendment... secures such a public
right of access, I agree with... my Brethren .... .- Id. at 585. (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart, concurring, stated: ° Mhe First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give
the press and the public the right to access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 599
(Stewart, J., concurring). Also, in concurrence, Justice Blackmun stated: "I am driven to conclude
... that the First Amendment must provide some measure of protection for public access to the
trial." Id. at 604 (BIackmun, J., concurring).
167. The Chief Justice traced the history of the trial back to the Norman conquest Id. at 564-
73. For an interesting discussion of the question left open by Richmond Newspapers, see generally
Comment, After Richmond Newspapers: A Public Right to Attend Civil Trials?, 4 COMMENT 241
(1982).
168. 448 U.S. at 577. See generally Note, The Richmond Newspapers Case: Creation of a First
Amendment Right ofAccess, 14 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1081 (1981-1982).
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Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court.1"9 In Globe Newspapers, a
majority of the Court agreed for the first time on the existence of
a constitutional right of media access to criminal trials.17 The
Court reasoned that the First Amendment right of access is based
upon two features of the criminal justice system: (1) The historical
openness of the criminal trial; and (2) the significant role of the
right of access in the functioning of the judicial process and the
government as a whole.'71 The Court held that any attempt to
deny this right of access in an effort to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information must be necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest and narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.
172
The presumption of openness to media access was extended to
all parts of the criminal trial in Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court.' Applying the standard announced in Globe Newspapers,
a majority of the Court 74 overturned a trial court's order denying
press and public access to the voir dire process in a murder
case. 175
The Supreme Court has recognized that news gathering merits
some First Amendment protection. 76  Further, the First
Amendment guarantees access to all parts of a criminal trial.'"
169. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
170. let at 606. Justice Brennan, writing for a five-justice majority, declared unconstitutional
a Massachusetts statute which closed trials during the testimony of minor victims of specific sex
offenses. Id
171. 1& at 605-06.
172. Id. at 606-07. Justice O'Connor concurred only in the judgment of the court, noting that
she did not interpret Globe Newspapers or Richmond Newspapers to be applicable outside the context
of criminal trials. Id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
173. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
174. Id. at 513. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment of the court only and filed a
separate opinion in which he argued that greater government interest must be shown before the
presumption of openness can be overcome. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
175. Id. at 512. The court held that the presumption of openness could only be overcome "by
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 514. The court found the trial court's closure order
unconstitutional, noting that the lower court had not made any specific findings or considered
alternatives to closure. Id.
176. Bmnzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
177. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,577 (1980); Globe Newspapers Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982); Press Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 512.
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This right of access is based upon the traditional openness of
criminal trials and the need for free access to the judicial process
and the government as a whole. 7 ' The Court has permitted
restrictions on this right only in the most compelling circumstances,
and even then only when no less restrictive alternatives are
available.179 These established principles are the basis for
extending the right of media access to the battlefield.
3. Access to Prisons
In addition to the judicial process, the right of media access has
been applied to prisons, a situation more analogous to the
battlefield. Similar to the battlefield, prisons have no historical
tradition of public openness, and the government interest in
regulating access is high.'80 Accordingly, when reviewing prison
administrative decisions, the Court will generally accord judicial
deference similar to that accorded to the military. 181
In the companion cases of Pell v. Procunier12 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 8 3 the Supreme Court, for the first time,
considered whether the right of the media to gather news
established a constitutional right of access to government-controlled
information.'84 These cases involved the right of the press to
178. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577; Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606; Press
Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 512.
179. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577; Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606; Press
Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 512.
180. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974). The district court noted that prison officials
linked a liberal press access policy to an escape attempt in which three staff members and two
inmates were killed. Id. at 832.
181. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,547 (1979) (stating that prison administrators "'should
be accorded wide ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security"). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)
(discussing the judicial deference afforded when reviewing prison administrative decisions).
182. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
183. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
184. Peil, 417 U.S. at 834. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)
(stating that government-controlled information is information not otherwise available to the public
generally). In Nixon, the Court held that the press had no right of physical access to the Watergate
tapes because the public did not have a right of access to such evidence. Id. at 783.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol 23
conduct face-to-face interviews with prison inmates.8 5 The press
claimed a constitutional privilege of special access to government-
controlled information in the absence of a substantial governmental
justification for withholding it. Specifically, the press attacked
prison rules which prohibited press contact with individual
prisoners.
186
The Court concluded that the prison regulations'87 did not
violate the First Amendment.'88 The majority refused to apply the
balancing test and weigh the interests of the government against
those of the press, as it normally does when the press asserts a
restriction on the free flow of information."8 9 Rather, the Court
simply stated that interest balancing was unnecessary because no
discrimination existed inasmuch as prison officials had barred both
the press and the public.' The majority concluded that its
recognition of some limited First Amendment protection for news
gathering did not create an affirmative duty on behalf of the
government to furnish the press with information not available to
the general public.' 9 '
Both the Pell and Saxbe majority opinions relied heavily upon
the availability of alternative means of acquiring information about
185. The facts involved in both cases were virtually identical and Justice Stewart authored both
majority opinions. Compare Pel, 417 U.S. at 821-23 with Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846-48.
186. Pell, 417 U.S. at 831-32. Prison officials initiated the interview prohibition following
prison violence that they claimed was linked, in part, to media attention concentrated on a few chosen
inmates. These prisoners acquired notoriety and influence over other inmates. Id
187. In Pell, section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual provided:
'[P]ress and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." Pell,
417 U.S. at 819. In Saxbe, the relevant Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement provided: "Press
representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. This rule shall apply even where
the inmate requests or seeks an interview. However, conversation may be permitted with inmates
whose identity is not to be made public if it is limited to the discussion of an institutional facilities
programs and activities." Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
188. Pelt, 417 U.S. at 835; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
189. See supra notes 150-156 and accompanying text (discussing application of the balancing
test).
190. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849. This analysis implies that the government could constitutionally
restrict the free flow of information guaranteed by the First Amendment by simply denying access
equally to both the press and the public. Such a drastic result could not have been intended by the
majority. See supra and infra notes 183-193 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
Saxbe decision).
191. Pe/!, 417 U.S. at 834.
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prison conditions! The Court observed that prison officials had
accorded both the press and the public some opportunity to observe
prison conditions.192 Further, the Court noted the lack of any
evidence indicating that prison officials intended to conceal
information from the media.1 93
Four years later, the Court faced a similar media access claim
to a penal institution in Houchins v. KQED.1 94 Houchins is
distinguishable from Pell and Saxbe, however, because in
Houchins, prison officials denied both the press and the public
access to information about prison conditions,195 creating a news
blackout similar to that imposed by the military in Grenada
196
and, to a lesser extent, in the Persian Gulf. 97 Thus, alternative
means of acquiring information, the Court's primary rationale for
denying access in Pell and Saxbe, were unavailable to the press in
Houchins.'98
Houchins involved a media request to tour and photograph a
California jail.' 99 The press specifically wanted to view the
192. Id at 830. The Court seemed anxious to stress the fact that other means of acquiring
information about prison conditions were readily available to the media. Prison policy restricted only
face-to-face interviews. The Court observed:
We note at the outset that this regulation is not part of an attempt by the State to conceal
the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press' investigation and reporting of those
conditions. Indeed, the record demonstrates that, under current corrections policy, both the
press and the general public are accorded full opportunities to observe prison conditions.
I In Saxbe, the Court expressed similar reliance: "Except for the limitation in Policy Statement
1220.1A on face-to-face press-inmate interviews, members of the press are accorded substantial
access to federal prisons in order to observe and report the conditions they find there.- Saxbe, 417
U.S. at 847. The court also noted that press representatives could arrange to tour the prison and
photograph any prison facility. Id. Additionally, inmates could correspond with members of the press.
Id.
193. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 847-49.
194. 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, CJ.).
195. Id at 6. The Chief Justice attempted to show that there were other means available to
obtain information about the prison, such as correspondence. Id. The dissent correctly demonstrated,
however, that correspondence and telephone privileges did not offer the public or the press
opportunity to observe conditions. Id. at 26 n.14. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text (discussing the media blackout in Grenada).
197. See supra notes 77-99 and accompanying text (discussing the media blackout in the
Persian Gull).
198. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 29r (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id at 37. The Santa Rita jail is located in Alameda County, California. A substantial
number of its inmates were pretrial detainees. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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controversial Greystone building where one court had found that
substandard living conditions existed.2" Prison officials denied
the media's request and a television station subsequently brought
suit.20
1
The Supreme Court, in a three-one-three decision, with Justice
Stewart writing the crucial concurrence, reversed the district court's
order requiring access.2' The Chief Justice, joined by Justices
Rehnquist and White, noted the importance of information
concerning prison conditions and recognized that the media
generally acts as an agent of the public in acquiring the
information.2 3 Nevertheless, the plurality found no constitutional
basis for requiring access to the jail.2"4 Justice Stewart reasoned
that there is no special right of media access to government-
controlled information, but argued in favor of a more flexible
access policy to accommodate the practical distinctions between the
press and the public.2 °5 Indeed, Justice Stewart would have
upheld a more limited access order,2' but agreed with the
200. See Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D.Cal. 1972) (holding that
conditions at the Greystone building were deplorable). "The shocking and debasing conditions which
prevailed there constituted cruel and unusual punishment for man or beast as a matter of law." Id.
201. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 18 Crim. L Rep. (BNA) 2252,2253 (N.D.Cal. 1975), affd, 546
F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1977). For a good review of the Ninth Circuit decision, see generally Note, Ninth
Circuit Holds Press Entitled to Greater Access to Prison Than Public, 45 FORDHAM L. R v. 1524
(1977).
202. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16. Justice Blackmun was ill at the time and did not participate in
the decision. Justice Marshall also did not participate, presumably because he was once general
counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which was a party to
the action.
203. Id. at 8 (plurality opinion of Burger C.J.).
204. Id. at 9. Also, in addition, the plurality found no basis for a constitutional duty to disclose
and did not set standards governing disclosure of information. Id. at 14.
205. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart disagreed with the plurality on the
meaning of "equal aceess." He argued: "That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom
of the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgement of the critical role played by the
press in American society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role and to the special needs
of the press in performing it effectively.' Id. at 17. For an interesting discussion of the distinctions
between the press and speech clauses, see generally Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 COLUM. L. RaV. 838 (1971).
206. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 18. Justice Stewart would have upheld the district court order
requiring press access to the jail on a more frequent basis and allowing the press to bring cameras
and other recording equipment. Id
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Court's judgment because he believed the lower court's order was
too broad. 7
Justice Stevens, with Justices Brennan and Powell, dissented,
arguing for the recognition of a media right of access. The dissent
noted that a core objective of the First Amendment is the
preservation of a free flow of information.0 ' Therefore, they
reasoned, information gathering is entitled to constitutional
protection.'
The prison cases add little solidity to the unsettled area of First
Amendment jurisprudence regarding media access to the battlefield.
In Pell, a bare majority of the Court found no special media right
of access, but seemed to limit its holding to the particular facts of
the case.210 Prison officials arguably provided sufficient access to
the prison to allow the public to inform itself about conditions
there.2 ' When one considers that all the press lost in the Pell
decision was the right to face-to-face interviews with specific
prisoners, the decision may be justified.
In Houchins, however, prison officials denied both the public
and the press all reasonable means of informing itself of conditions
at the prison.212 In that case, no particular opinion commanded a
majority of the Justicies. Houchins is important because it indicates
that most of the members of the Court at that time differentiated
between reasonable access to important information and no access
whatsoever. That difference is crucial when analyzing the denial of
press access to the battlefield in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian
Gulf.
207. Id at 18. The district court order required press access to the Greystone building and
allowed random interviews with inmates. Thus, the order permitting press access to areas and sources
not granted to the public. Id
208. Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 32. The dissent did, however, recognize that some functions of the government
necessarily require secrecy, such as grand jury proceedings, the court's own conferences, and
executive sessions. Id. at 35. The dissent concluded that there is no legitimate penological
justification for concealing the condition of prisoners. Id. at 36.
210. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974).
211. Id.
212. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (public and press consistently denied
access to areas where inmates confined and mail censored).
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C. Applying The Right Of Access To The Battlefield
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly articulated a
definitive test for invoking the right of media access, the Court's
decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspapers suggest
a three-part test:213 (1) the constitutional claimant must show that
the area has historically been open to the press and general
public;,- (2) the right of access must be significant in the
functioning of the process in question and the government as a
whole;215 and (3) assuming the first two tests have been satisfied,
access may be denied only if the government establishes that the
denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.21 Application of this
test to the battlefield suggests that the press has a valid right of
access under the First Amendment.
On the battlefield, the first prong of the test is the most difficult
to satisfy. The press must show a tradition of public openness to
the battlefield. History supports an assertion of press openness,
based on the access war correspondents have historically
213. See PublickerIndus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059,1066-71 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying three-part
test to allow access to civil trial); Cassel, supra note 6, at 958 (Globe and Richmond suggest a three
part test); Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspapers Co.
v. Superior Court, 51 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 286, 290 (1984) (applying Globe as a model for determining
access rights to governmental proceedings).
214. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982). In at least one
context, the need to show a history of openness has been called into question by a lower court, See
United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cit. 1983). In Chagra, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated: "Because the First Amendment must be interpreted in the context of current values
and conditions [citations omitted], the lack of an historic tradition of open bail reduction hearings
does not bar our recognizing a right of access to such hearings." Id. at 363.
215. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606.
216. Id.
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enjoyed.217 Yet, the battlefield has never been open to members
of the public.
The Supreme Court has recognized the key role of the press in
contributing to "an uninhibited market-place of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail. ' "18 Further, a majority of the Court
has recognized the quasi-public role of the press in disseminating
information. 19 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that the press
acts as an agent of the public."
Since the press acted as the agent of the public when it
accompanied military commanders and troops into battles
throughout history, a tradition of public openness has been
established. The use of agency principles to "create" a tradition of
public openness merely recognizes the reality of the media's role
in society.221 The government affirms this role, as well as the
press' agent status, whenever it allows the press access to places
inaccessible to the general public.m Thus, the first prong of the
right of access test is satisfied on the battlefield.
The second prong of the right of access test asks whether
access to the process in question plays a significant role in the
217. It must be conceded that the press cannot show an unbroken history of access to military
operations, but neither could the press show an unbroken history of access to the criminal trial.
Courtrooms had been closed for a variety of reasons prior to Richmond Newspapers. See, e.g., United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1972) (public properly excluded from criminal trial in
order to maintain confidentiality of "hijacker profile"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United
States ex rel Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272,1273-74 (2d Cir. 1975) (courtroom cleared to maintain
secrecy of government undercover agents), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); United States ex rel
Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1977) (trial court excluded public but not press
during the testimony of rape victim), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978).
218. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
219. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
220. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). The press acts as public agent when
gathering information. Id. at 863.
221. See Cox Broadcasting Corp., 420 U.S. at 491 (the public necessarily relies on the press
to provide information).
222. For instance, the White House, closed to the general public, is accessible to a corp of
journalists and photographers. The press is routinely allowed access to Pentagon briefings and news
conferences to which the public is not invited. When the military unveils a new weapon, the press,
not the public, is generally asked to observe the demonstration.
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functioning of that process and the government as a whole.3 3 In
regard to the battlefield, the question is whether public scrutiny is
significantly necessary to military operations. The press can
convincingly argue in the affirmative. The military depends on
public financial support for its existence 24 and constantly utilizes
the press to influence public opinion and create support for its
policies. Thus, the military itself has recognized the functional
significance of public scrutiny.
In Globe Newspapers, the Court found that public scrutiny of
criminal trials fosters the appearance of fairness and safeguards the
judicial process.2's A similar argument can be made about press
access to military operations. Such access fosters trust in our
government and helps to ensure that the government's military
power is used justly. 6 Thus, press access to military operations
plays a significant role in the functioning of the military and the
government as a whole. Consequently, the second prong of the
right of access test is satisfied.
Since the first two prongs of the right of access test are
satisfied in the case of military operations, the press should be able
to claim a general First Amendment right of access to the
battlefield. Under the third prong of the test, however, the military
may still bar reporters from the battlefield in specific instances if
it has a compelling interest in doing so, and if no less restrictive
223. Lewis, A Public Right to KnowAbout Public Institutions: The FirstAmendment as Sword,
1980 SuP. Cr. REv. 1, 23. Anthony Lewis argues that this second factor should be phrased in terms
of accountability: "The question in each case should be whether the closing of a governmental
institution to the public, the denial of access prevents accountability." Id If closure denies the public
any effective way to scrutinize the institution, Lewis would urge access. Id at 24.
224. The military's budget last year amounted to more than $286 billion. 1991 ALMANAC, St.
Martin Press, at 102.
225. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). "Public scrutiny of
a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact finding process .... ".
Id. See Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596-97 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that publicizing a trial aids accurate fact finding).
226. Cassel, supra note 6, at 961. While Cassel acknowledges this argument with respect to
the judicial process, he contends that similar concerns do not arise in the military context. Cassel
grudgingly admits that the public should know how the troops are faring, but denies that the press
facilitates that function. Instead, the author would relegate that function to congressional hearings.
Id. It is hard to imagine a more important and accepted function of the press in wartime. It is unclear
how a congressional hearing could accomplish that function.
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alternatives are available.227  A determination of these
requirements mandates further analogy to the courtroom access
cases.
A majority of the Court has never articulated definitive
standards for closure of the courtroom under the third prong of the
access test. However, Justices Powell and Blackmun provided
closure tests in the Gannett decision.' 2 Further, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a test which is a combination
of both the Powell and Blackmun tests in United States v.
Chagra. 9  This test may be easily adapted to the context of
military operations to test the constitutionality of any denial of
press access to the battlefield. Specifically, under the adapted
Chagra test, the military may overcome the First Amendment right
of access if: (1) National security will be prejudiced by allowing
the press access to the battlefield; (2) alternatives to denying access
cannot adequately protect national security; and (3) denial of access
will be effective in protecting against the perceived danger to
227. See Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 607 (attempt to deny access to inhibit disclosure of
sensitive information must be necessitated by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored).
228. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 400-01 (1979). Justice Powell suggested the
following test-
1. Whether alternative means are available so that fairness may be preserved.
2. Any exclusion order may go no further than necessary to achieve that goal.
3. The public and the press must be given an opportunity to be heard.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun suggested stricter standards:
1. Irreparable damage to defendant's right of fair trial will result.
2. Alternatives will not adequately protect that right.
3. Closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm.
Id. at 440-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The lower federal courts and state courts are divided, with
neither test commanding a clear majority. See, e.g. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 364-65
(5th Cir. 1983) (combination of tests adopted); United States v. Brooklier, 684 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1982) (Blackmun test with two procedural prerequisites adopted); United States v. Powers, 622
F.2d 317, 323 (8th Cir. 1980) (Blackmun test adopted), cert denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
229. 701 F.2d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 1983). The court formulated the test as follows:
We hold that a defendant seeking closure of a pretrial bond reduction hearing overcomes
the First Amendment right of access to that hearing if he shows that-
(1) his right to a fair trial will likely be prejudiced by conducting the hearing
publicly;
(2) alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect his fair trial right; and
(3) closure will probably be effective in protecting against the perceived
danger.
Id.
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national security. By applying this test to the recent military
operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, the
boundaries of the right of access to the battlefield may be
identified.
1. The Right of Access in Grenada
The Grenada invasion was the first major American military
action to follow the Vietnam War."' More importantly, the
exclusion of the press from Grenada constituted the most extensive
denial of press access to the battlefield in American history. Not
only did the military fail to inform the press before the invasion
began, but the military excluded the press from accompanying the
invasion force. Further, the military refused to assist, and in some
cases, actively prevented reporters from visiting Grenada until two
days after the invasion began.
In the wake of the invasion, the military attempted to justify its
decision not to inform the press by claiming that the Grenada
invasion was a commando-style rescue raid, similar to the
American hostage rescue attempt in Iran.23" ' According to the
Pentagon, the possibility of security breaches prevented the military
from alerting the press in advance of the invasion. 32
230. Invasion Troops Trained to Make Surprise Raids, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A16, col.
5.
231. After the invasion, military officials and others argued that the Grenada raid was a
lightning-quick commando-style rescue mission. Compare Curbs on Grenada News Reporter Hit,
L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, § 1, at 9, col. I (California Rep. Carlos Moorhead (R. Glendale) described
Grenada invasion as -a rescue mission using commando-tactics" much like the Iran hostage rescue
attempt) with ABC News Program Viewpoint, 1984: Secrecy, Security And The Media 6 (Jan. 19,
1984) (Statement of Jack Nelson, Los Angeles Times Washington Bureau Chief) ("I don't think
anybody accepts that it was strictly a commando-style operation. It was an invasion of almost
traditional kind of planning.") and id. at 5 (statement of Michael Burch, Ass't Sec'y of Defense for
Public Affairs) ("It was not a set battle plan such as journalists are used to covering with our forces.
It was basically a commando-style operation where the first forces were to get the students that were
to be rescued, secure them and, basically, wait for rescue themselves.").
232. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57, 58 (D.D.C. 1984) (declaration of Ass't Sec'y of
Defense Michael Burch). Burch said there was no way to inform the press in advance with the
assurance that the information and the operation would not be compromised. Declaration of Michael
Burch at 12.
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Under the test adapted from Chagra, this claim amounts to an
assertion that national security would have been prejudiced by
informing the press.
In order for the military's decision to deny media access in
Grenada to be constitutionally justified, based upon a purported
threat to national security, there must have been no less restrictive
alternates available at that time which would not have posed a
security threat. Although some less restrictive alternatives may have
been available in advance of the invasion, such as informing the
press but instructing them to withhold the information until after
the invasion began, the military could convincingly argue that such
alternatives would not have adequately ensured the surprise of the
operation.
However, the claim of a threat to national security does not
justify the exclusion of the press from accompanying the invasion
force. Even if the invasion of Grenada was comparable to the
attempted hostage rescue in Iran, 3 this similarity does not
explain why the military did not allow a small group of
correspondents to witness the invasion. Apparently, the military had
enough time to assemble and brief military photographers, and
enough room on the planes to transport them, along with their
equipment, with the initial assault force.2" Certainly, members
of the press could just as easily have accompanied the troops. Any
interest in national security could have been protected by censoring
the content of reports from the field or by controlling the timing of
the reports. These less restrictive alternatives repudiate any claim
that exclusion of the press from the Grenada invasion force was
justified under the adapted Chagra test.
Finally, the military's refusal to allow journalists access to
Grenada for two days was unjustified. The Pentagon claimed that
233. The sheer size of the invasion force undercuts the Pentagon's claim that this was a
commando-style rescue raid similar to the American hostage rescue attempt in Iran. More than 1900
soldiers were involved in the invasion of Grenada, whereas only 180 soldiers were involved in Iran.
B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why it Failed, 1985 U.S. NAVAL INsnTru, at 1.
234. See U. S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action: News Groups Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1983, at Al, col. 6 (commenting that Department of Defense photographers accompanied invasion
force).
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after the invasion began, logistical problems prevented the military
from transporting the press to the island." 5 It is questionable
whether concerns with logistics qualify as an interest in national
security under the adapted Chagra test. Yet, even if the refusal to
help the press reach the island was justified, actively preventing
journalists from independently travelling to Grenada was not. After
the President's public announcement of the invasion, the need for
complete secrecy disappeared. After that time, the military had no
valid security reason for the complete exclusion of journalists that
continued until two days after the invasion.
In evaluating the governmental interest in denying access to
Grenada, it is important to consider the deference the Court
traditionally accords military decisions." The Court weighs this
traditional deference to the military against the availability of
alternative means of acquiring information. 7 In Grenada, no
alternative means were available to the press for gathering
information. Further, evidence indicates that the military may have
excluded the press in an attempt to conceal the conditions in
Grenada or simply to frustrate media efforts.2' Judicial deference
235. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57, 58 (D. D.C. 1984); Declaration of Michael Burch
at 13. The military did not want media aircraft using the runway and no military aircraft were
available to transport reporters. Id. See Reporting the News in a Communique War, N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1983, at Al, col. 3 (officials claimed media presence would complicate logistical problems).
236. The Supreme Court has exhibited a willingness to undertake full review of military affairs.
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679-82 (1973) (review of statutes requiring women
but not men to prove spousal dependency to receive benefits); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349
(1980) (First Amendment challenge of regulation prohibiting solicitation of signatures without official
approval); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830-34 (1976) (review of base commander's decision to
exclude political speakers from base). However, the court has recognized the need to allow the
military flexibility in the operation of the armed forces. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
304 (1983) (judges should not run the military); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) (need
for "healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs"); Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953) ("a large area of discretion as to particular duties must be
left to commanding officers").
237. For instance, the Pell court considered the amount of deference it should pay to prison
administration decisions in light of alternate channels of communications available to prisoners. Poll
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974).
238. U.S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action; News Groups Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1984,
at A23, col. 6. "Confusing and fragmentary information was offered and White House Press
Secretary Larry] Speaks, complaining about the accuracy of some news reports, ultimately refused
to take additional questions from one reporter he considered annoying. 'I'm tired of dealing with
you,* he said. 'You're carrying your management's water on this thing,* he said fo another reporter,
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to the military under these conditions is unlikely. Therefore, the
military's treatment of the press during the invasion of Grenada
amounted to a violation of the constitutional right of media access.
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the Grenada invasion, the
basic dimensions of the right of access to the battlefield are clear.
In essence, the right of access prohibits the military from
completely excluding the press from a military action, as occurred
during the Grenada invasion. In virtually every operation, whether
intended as a surprise or not, some less restrictive alternative will
exist."' Indeed, the press pool system created in response to
media complaints in the wake of the Grenada invasion is one
example of a valid, less restrictive alternative. By establishing the
press pool, the military supposedly ensured that the constitutional
right of press access would not be violated in future operations.
However, an analysis of how the pool system performed in Panama
reveals that the military continues to infringe upon the First
Amendment right of access to the battlefield.
2. The Right of Access in Panama
In theory, by utilizing a press pool during the invasion of
Panama, the military employed a less restrictive alternative to the
unconstitutional denial of media access that occurred in Grenada.
In practice, however, the pool proved to be just as restrictive, at
least during the crucial initial hours of the invasion.24 ° Arguably,
the failure of the pool system in Panama resulted from nothing
who had asked why reporters could not go to the island." Id. See U.S. Admits Air attack on Hospital
in Grenada, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, § I, at 1, col. 2 (confirmation of attack of civilian hospital
came only after reports surfaced in the press).
239. In some few situations, however, such as lightning-quick, small-scale rescue raids, there
may be no less restrictive alternatives to total exclusion. Even the most ardent access proponents
concede that some military operations are not conducive to press participation or necessarily must
remain secret even from trusted war correspondents. See Landau, Excluding the Press from the
Grenada Invasion: A Violation of the Public's Constitutional Rights, Editor and Publisher, Dec. 10,
1983, at 10 (quick, in-and-out rescue missions, such as the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, cannot be
constitutionally accessible to the press).
240. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictions placed upon the
press pool in Panama).
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more than "incompetence.", 241 Yet some evidence suggests that
the failure resulted from willful mismanagement by the Pentagon.
Although the military did transport the pool reporters from
Washington to Panama, the pool did not accompany the troops, as
had occurred during prior military exercises.u 2 A delay in
transportation occurred because of an "excessive concern with
secrecy" on the part of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who
decided not to activate the pool until after the evening news on
December 19, 1989.243 This decision may well have amounted to
an unconstitutional violation of the right of access. By activating
the pool too late, Cheney effectively denied the press access to the
initial invasion. Moreover, he rejected a less restrictive alternative
to this complete denial by rejecting a plan to form a pool from
reporters already in Panama.
Additional mishandling of the situation occurred after the pool
arrived in Panama, when the military failed to provide the pool
with transportation. Combined with the exclusion of nonpool
reporters from landing in the country and the late activation of the
pool, this failure helped ensure that most of the hostilities in
Panama occurred out of sight of the press. Thus, despite the use of
the press pool in Panama, the military still denied the press access
to the battlefield.
The events in Panama further define the boundaries of the right
of media access. This right demands that the military do more than
merely institute a press pool system. The military must also employ
that system correctly, allowing the pool to cover all stages of a
military operation. If the military cannot adequately accomplish
these requirements, then nonpool reporters must be allowed access
to the battlefield. Anything less constitutes a denial of access and
a violation of the First Amendment.
241. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of the press pool
in Panzma).
242. Jones, Editors Say Journalists Were Kept From Action, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1989, at
A19, cot. 3.
243. Gordon, Cheney Blamed for Press Problems in Panama, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1990, at
AS, cot. 4 (quoting a report by Fred S. Hoffman).
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3. The Right of Access in the Persian Gulf
In the Persian Gulf, the military once again mismanaged the
press pool system. However, this mismanagement did not appear
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, as it did in Panama.
Although the number of pool spots was limited, pool reporters were
allowed access to most of the troops.2' While the security review
system caused delays and resulted in some censorship, this system,
like the censorship that occurred during the Korean War,245
permitted the military to allow the pool access to the troops.
Although the military may have used the pool and security review
systems to manipulate the news from the Persian Gulf, this
manipulation did not constitute a First Amendment denial of press
access to the battlefield.
More troubling than the inconveniences of the pool and security
review systems, however, was the Pentagon's news blackout during
the initial hours of the ground assault. This blackout probably rose
to the level of a constitutional violation of the right of access. By
suspending press briefings and delaying pool dispatches, the
military effectively denied the press and the public access to any
information whatsoever about the ground assault. This denial of
access was comparable to the denial during the invasion of
Grenada and to the initial hours of the invasion of Panama.
The news blackout during the Gulf War violated the
constitutional right of access because, as in Grenada and Panama,
less restrictive alternatives were available. The Pentagon admitted
that its real concern was not about protecting any overall secrecy
of the assault, but about concealing the location of U.S. Army
troops in western Iraq.246 To ensure the security of this force, the
military could have restricted or censored pool reports and pictures
from pool members travelling with the troops. This less restrictive
244. Balzar, supra note 87, at A23, col. 1. Pool reporters had "'mostly open access to the
fighting and support troops." l There were some complaints, however, that the pool had limited
access to ground forces. See Old Suspicions, supra note 89, at A9, col. 4.
245. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text (discussing the security review system
employed during the Korean War).
246. See Rosenstiel, supra note 94, at A20, col. 2.
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alternative to a total news blackout would have adequately
protected the security interest involved, while allowing the press to
report on the majority of Air Force, Navy, and Marine operations
during the assault. 247
The events in the Persian Gulf narrow the dimensions of the
right of access to the battlefield. Although some members of the
press would argue that the First Amendment contemplates
unrestricted access to American military operations, restrictions on
the press such as those applied in the Persian Gulf may actually
survive a challenge of unconstitutionality. What will not survive
such a constitutional challenge, however, is a blanket news
blackout unjustified by national security interests. The military
must narrowly tailor its news policies to allow the press access to
as much of the battlefield as possible.
BI. CONCLUSION
When American invasion forces landed in Grenada in October
of 1983 unaccompanied by representatives of the independent
press, a history of voluntary cooperation between the media and the
military came to an abrupt end. The ensuing news blackout violated
the First Amendment right of the media to access to the battlefield.
In Panama, military mishandling of the press pool system
established in the wake of the Grenada invasion effectively resulted
in a denial of media access during the initial stages of the invasion.
In the Persian Gulf, the military once again created an
unconstitutional news blackout during the early part of the ground
assault.
The events in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf
demonstrate the need for clear judicial guidelines establishing the
permissible scope of media access to the battlefield. This Article
suggests that the press, as an agent of the public, may claim a First
Amendment right of access to the battlefield. This right of access
prohibits complete exclusion of the press from a military action.
While the military may impose reasonable restrictions on the
247. Id.
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media, such as the institution of a press pool, these restrictions
must be administered in a manner which allows all stages of a
military operation to be covered by at least some members of the
media. Although the First Amendment does not guarantee unlimited
access to the battlefield, press restrictions must be narrowly tailored
to accomplish a legitimate purpose and to provide as much media
access as is reasonably possible.
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